Annotations from ¶ 166 of Hegel’s PdG
First we deal with the dialectic, and then self-consciousness.
It must begin with x.
x is a simple place-holder, entirely empty, yet full of the potential for meaning.
x is the first instance, it is the pre-dialectical place-holder. It is the moment of naïve clarity, to which many (Buddhists, Heidegger etc.1) might wish us to return. It is a tantalising moment, in that all moments of clarity which follow will be lesser (though, more wise and knowledgeable) as they progress. If only we could return there, to that emptiness, to that perfect negation of all which will follow.
However, with x, there must be not-x. And, in fact, we knew it already, since we already knew enough to give x a symbol. In the moment of pre-dialectical clarity, we have no symbols to ascribe to this object. So from x to not-x, the dialectic can do nothing but begin.
In all instances, I will symbolise the dialectical movement thus:
(x–>y)–>y qua x
x and y are simple place-holders
–> is a symbol meaning “gives way to”
So, for that symbolic formulation to be true, we must believe that the process of a first symbol giving way to a second, causes the giving way (of the first symbol to the second) to itself give way to the second symbol as being able to occupy the place of the first symbol.
We can demonstrate this by now expanding the symbolic meaning to our placeholder symbols.
x = x in itself
y = not x
(x–>y)–>y qua x
By x giving waytonot x, we see that not x is equal in symbolic function to x; y can itself occupy the symbolic function of x (y in itself), thus turning x into not y. Therefore:
(y–>x)–>x qua y
Thus, in symbolic function, if not in any other function, x = y.
Moving on:
x = objectknown from the position of itself [from now on: object in itself]
y = object known from the position of not-itself [from now on: object for another]
(x–>y)–>y qua x
The object for another is itself an object. An object can be for another and it can be in itself. Therefore, an object for another can be in itself an object in itself (y qua x). Furthermore, For the other, y is not object for another at all, but it is object in itself, while x is object for another:y is y in itself; y is x for another, and x is y for another. The object is in itself for itself; however, from the position ofanother, the other is object in itself. Object in itself does not relate to itself as object except through an other. Therefore, Object qua object is Object for another, whereas Object in itself is not object at all, but conception of object via the dialectical movement of self-knowledge: object in itself is prior to the other, and to be without the other is to be unbounded and infinite ; the introduction of the other (y) produces boundaries on the Object (x); y knows x qua object; x knows y qua object; the knowledge of the other is knowledge of the object, therefore Object in itself (prior to knowledge of the other) is not constituted as object.
Thus, we have motion from Object in itself qua object, giving way to Object in itself qua not-object.
x = objectknown from the position of itself
y = not-object known from the position of itself
(x–>y)–>y qua x
For us, as student of this dialectical motion of object (as Object in itself, as Object for another, as concrete thing of conception etc.), we see object give way to not-object, and in so doing we are able to constitute exactly the object of our study – the dialectical motion of object; or, to put it another way:
x = object (as focus of our study)
y = not-object (as focus of our study)
(x–>y)–>y qua x
[And, of course, x qua y]
In our knowledge of object, we see what Hegel calls “the movement of knowledge”, which he proposes we might call “conception”. If we instead see this knowledge as a single, discrete entity (or a “simple unity” in Hegelian terms2), which Hegel suggests we call “object”, then we have the makings of another dialectical progression.
x = knowledge as dialectical movement; conception
y = knowledge as simple unity; object
(x–>y)–>y qua x
The knowledge which arises through movement gives way to knowledge as a simple unity, yet this opposition itself gives way to simple unity existing as movement, to knowledge-object existing as knowledge-conception. As Hegel says, for knowledge itself, “the object corresponds to the conception”. Finally, we arrive at something very important: the idea that knowledge has knowledge of itself; the self-consciousness which is Hegel’s concern in this chapter of the phenomenology.
1For discussions on the relationship between Heidegger and Buddhism, and the evaluation of Dasein as what I call the Hegelian “first instance”, see McGowen, T. & Engley, R. (Hosts). (2021, 5 September). Heidegger and Hegel [Audio Podcast Episode]. In Why Theory. SoundCloud. https://soundcloud.com/whytheory/heidegger-and-hegel
2Hegel also suggests this can be called “Ego”, which could potentially be very interesting to probe into, but the opportunity doesn’t yet present itself.
James Waide 